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The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated
Felon or Legal Fiction?
Brenda S. Hustis*and John Y. Gotanda**

I. INTRODUCTION

Criminal enforcement of environmental laws through the prosecution of corporate officers and managers has dramatically increased in
recent years.' Working together, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") have adopted a policy, based upon the powerful deterrent effect of personal liability for corporate wrongdoing, that directs
enforcement personnel to seek criminal penalties against the highest
ranking officers in the corporate hierarchy for whom personal culpability for environmental crimes can be shown.2 Corporate officers and
managers make up a startling 80% of all individuals who have been
prosecuted for environmental crimes since 1983. 3 Not only has there
been a significant rise in the imposition of personal criminal liability
against corporate officers, but overall fines and convictions for environmental violations have sharply increased in recent years. In the last
four years alone, the DOJ has "collected more penalties and sent more
people to jail for
environmental crimes than in the entire previous his4
tory of EPA."
*

Associate, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Massachusetts; B.A., 1990, Boston

College; J.D., 1993, The University of Texas School of Law.
** Associate, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Massachusetts; B.A., 1984,
University of Hawaii; J.D., 1987, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawaii.
1. See Barry M. Hartman & Charles A. De Monaco, The Present Use of the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement of Environmental
Laws, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,145, 10,146 (March 1993).
2. See F. Henry Habicht, II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal
Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,478, 10,480 (Dec. 1987).
3. Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,146. Of 565 individuals prosecuted for
environmental crimes, 451 were officers and managers of corporations. Id. at 10,146
n.9.
4. Better Communication with Government, Public Said to Reduce Chance of
Criminal Enforcement, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1423, 1424 (Sept. 18, 1992) [hereinafter
Better Communication]. A DOJ official has estimated that 94% of all fines ever collected by the DOJ for environmental violations were assessed from 1988 to 1992. Id.
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This climate of heavy prosecutorial activity has been especially
worrisome to corporate management in light of the controversial emergence of the "responsible corporate officer" ("RCO") doctrine in prosecutions under federal environmental statutes. The RCO doctrine,
which arose in the context of misdemeanor prosecutions under strict
liability public welfare statutes, provides that a corporate officer may
be held personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate employee
if the officer "had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and ... failed to do
",5
SO.

Courts and commentators have varied widely in their interpretations
of both the scope and applicability of the RCO doctrine in criminal
prosecutions under federal environmental statutes that prescribe
felony-level penalties and contain a mens rea requirement. According
to those authorities who espouse a broad definition and application of
the RCO doctrine, liability may be based solely on a person's position
and authority in the corporation, thus displacing any express statutory
mens rea requirement and creating a strict liability offense that is punishable as a felony.6 Such a sweeping application of the RCO doctrine
could result in felony-level criminal liability being imposed against a
corporate officer for the environmental crime of a subordinate even
when the officer had no knowledge of the illegal activity, thus making
the officer a "designated felon."7
In contrast, under the narrow application of the RCO doctrine advocated by other courts and commentators, criminal liability should not
be based upon an individual's position in a company. Rather, the
doctrine simply functions as another way to prove, through circumstantial evidence, that the corporate officer had the mens rea required
by the statute.8 Under this approach, a corporate officer may only be
held personally liable for the criminal act committed by a subordinate if
The same official estimated that, in addition, 68% of all jail time ever served for environmental violations was imposed during this period. Id.
5. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975).
6. See infra part IV.A. See generally Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You

Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099 (Feb. 1992)
(specifically discussing the application of the RCO doctrine to prosecutions brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1991)); Ronald M. Broudy, Note, RCRA and the Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine: Getting Tough on Corporate Offenders by Sidestepping the Mens Rea
Requirement, 80 Ky. L.J. 1055 (1991-92).
7. See Better Communication, supra note 4, at 1424.

8.

See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,152-53; infra part IV.C.
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the officer had actual knowledge of the violation. 9 Viewed from this
perspective, the belief that the RCO doctrine provides an independent
basis for criminal liability under federal environmental statutes is, in
fact, a legal fiction.
In light of such varying views, it comes as no surprise that there has
been considerable confusion not only concerning the meaning and
application of the RCO doctrine, but also concerning the practical
effect of its use in the prosecution of corporate officers for environmental crimes. Because of the unsettled state of the law in this area, a
fear exists among corporate officers that they could be held criminally
liable for a subordinate's violation of an environmental statute even
though they had no knowledge of the violation.
This Article examines the origin of the RCO doctrine and analyzes
attempts to extend its application to felony prosecutions under federal
environmental laws that expressly include a showing of mens rea as an
element of the crime. Part II of this Article traces the origin and development of the RCO doctrine in strict liability cases. Part m discusses
the mens rea requirement for felonies contained in various federal environmental statutes, including the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act. Part IV reviews three
theories on the application of the RCO doctrine to felony prosecutions
under these statutes and examines the cases used to support each
theory. Part V analyzes the propriety of each of these theories, while
Part VI evaluates their implications. Finally, Part VII concludes by
urging that although the RCO doctrine should not be applied to environmental statutes imposing felony-level penalties and containing an
explicit mens rea requirement, it should be permissible to use an officer's position in a company as circumstantial evidence that the officer
had the requisite mens rea for a particular environmental offense. °
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE

Under traditional concepts of criminal law, a corporate officer could
only be held personally liable for criminal acts that the officer directed,
authorized, ratified, or personally undertook."' For instance, direct
9. See infra part iV.C.
10. Courts have also applied the RCO doctrine in the civil context. See, e.g., In re
Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("[I]mposing liability on corporate officers is especially appropriate in the civil context."). This application, however, exceeds the scope of this Article and will not be addressed.
11. See John F. Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under
Federal Environmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 337, 340 (June 9, 1989) (citing
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individual liability would attach where a corporate officer personally
engaged in illegal activity, such as filing a false report or disposing of
hazardous waste without a permit. 2 Similarly, an officer who commanded or authorized the unlawful act of another person could be held
personally liable for the violation. 3 Such an authorization could even
be as subtle as directing a subordinate to dispose of waste as cheaply
and conveniently as possible, when the officer knew
that the subordi14
nate would probably dispose of the waste illegally.
Beginning in the 1940's, courts began to analyze the personal
liability of corporate officers under a different standard in certain circumstances. This standard, which has become known as the RCO
doctrine, 15 states that a corporate officer may be held criminally liable
for the failure to prevent or correct the criminal violation of a subordinate over whom the officer has responsibility or authority. 6 Personal
criminal liability is imposed on the officer on the basis that the officer
had a "responsible relation" 1to
the violation, even if the officer was not
7
aware of the illegal activity.
The RCO doctrine arose from two United States Supreme Court

United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 545 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1015 (1978), which held that an officer may be held personally liable in a corporate
fraud scheme only where he or she was a "conscious promoter" of the scheme).
12. See Alan Zarky, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 5 Tox. L. Rep.
(BNA) 983, 985 (1991).
13. See id.
14. See Seymour, supra note 11, at 340 (citing United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447
(11 th Cir. 1988), which held that a jury could have concluded that an employer's previous approval of illegal dumping and his directive to an employee to "handle" the problem of excess waste constituted an implicit order to dump the waste illegally).
15. It is important to note that although termed the responsible "corporate" officer
doctrine, the application of the doctrine is not limited to officers of corporations. In
one case, for example, the court invoked the RCO doctrine in convicting civilian
employees of the U.S. Army-managers within a federal government organization-of
illegally disposing of hazardous chemicals in violation of RCRA. United States v. Dee,
912 F.2d 741, 747-49 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that although a civilian chemical engineer and his two supervisors were informed of the improper storage of hazardous chemicals, they failed to ensure proper storage, and concluding that "[the defendants'] criminal
culpability arises solely from their ongoing failure to comply with RCRA during the
period they were responsible for the [chemical plant]"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919
(1991).
16. See Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge
Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 862, 882 (1991). See also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975),
discussed infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text; United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 281 (1943), discussed infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
17. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 986; Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74; Dotterweich, 320
U.S. at 281.
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decisions 8 involving prosecutions under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA")."9 The FDCA prohibits, inter alia,
the shipment in interstate commerce of misbranded or adulterated food
and drugs. 20 Congress enacted the FDCA in an effort to expand its
ability to prevent illicit and noxious articles, such as impure and adulterated food and drugs, from entering the stream of commerce.2 ' To
achieve this goal, Congress designed the FDCA as a strict liability
statute that dispenses with the conventional requirements for criminal
conduct-an awareness of some wrongdoing-and imposes liability
without regard to the state of mind of the violator.22
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the
personal liability of a corporate officer under the FDCA in United
States v. Dotterweich.2 3 Dotterweich, the president and general manager of a small pharmaceutical packaging company, had been convicted, along with his company, for misdemeanor violations of the
FDCA involving the shipment of misbranded drugs in interstate
commerce. 4 On appeal of his conviction, Dotterweich, who supervised the day-to-day operations of the company, 25 argued that he could
not be held personally liable for the violations because only the corporation was a "person" subject to prosecution within the meaning of the
statute. 26 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the statutory term
"person" includes both corporations and individuals and that the
offense of shipping misbranded or adulterated drugs in interstate
commerce is committed "by all who.., have.., a responsible share
18. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 (1943).
19. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1988).
2 1. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280. The Court characterized the FDCA as being
necessary to protect "the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection." Id.
22. Id. at 281.
23. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
24. Id. at 278. Dotterweich was convicted under § 301(a) of the FDCA, which prohibited "'[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any ...
drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded."' Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)). The
offenses charged in the indictment consisted of "(1) the apparent use of 'old' labels that
incorrectly stated the presence of an ingredient that had not been in such drugs for ten
months; and, (2) a label overstating the amount of an ingredient in a second drug."
Richard G. Singer, The Myth of the Doctrine of the Responsible Corporate Officer, 6
Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1378, 1380 & n.26 (Apr. 8, 1992) [hereinafter Singer, Myth].
25. See Singer, Myth, supra note 24, at 1380.
26. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 279. The Circuit Court of Appeals had accepted
Dotterweich's reasoning and reversed his conviction. Id.
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in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws...
though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. '' 27 The
Court added that "the historic conception
of a 'misdemeanor' makes all
28
those responsible for it equally guilty.,,
In holding Dotterweich personally liable for violations of the FDCA
even though there was no showing that he knew of or participated in
the illegal activity, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for the RCO
doctrine. Although it acknowledged the apparent inequity in penalizing an officer who had no knowledge of the wrongdoing, the Court
concluded that this result was appropriate because it was the product of
a legislative balancing of hardships.29 Congress, the Court explained,
perceived that the health risks to innocent and "wholly helpless" consumers outweighed any hardships suffered by officers like
Dotterweich, who might not have intended to violate the statute, but
who nevertheless stood in a "responsible relation to a public danger"
and at least had an opportunity to inform himself of the existence of
potentially dangerous conditions before engaging in the illicit
commerce. 30 Thus, the Court determined that for the benefit of the
public welfare, Congress had placed the risk of hardship upon those
standing in a position of "responsible relation" to the harm.3
The Supreme Court refused to delineate precisely what might constitute a responsible relation, stating that it would be "too treacherous" to
define or illustrate the class of employees who might be vulnerable to
liability on the basis of their position.3 2 The Court stated that "[t]o
attempt a formula embracing the variety of conduct whereby persons
may responsibly contribute in furthering [an unlawful transaction] ...
would be mischievous futility. ''33 Instead, the Court concluded that
"the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and
the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted" in such matters.34
Over thirty years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified
the Dotterweich holding in United States v. Park.35 Defendant Park,
the president of a national food store chain, had been convicted under
the FDCA for causing the contamination of food held for sale
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 284.
Id.at 281.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85.
Id.at 281, 285.
Id.
Id.at 285.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
Id.
421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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following its shipment in interstate commerce by 'allowing it to be
stored in a rodent-infested warehouse.3 6 On appeal, Park argued that
he could not be held criminally liable for the FDCA violation because
he had delegated responsibility for warehouse sanitation to
"dependable subordinates" and therefore was not personally involved
in the wrongful conduct. 37 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
it was not necessary for the government to prove that Park had
committed a "wrongful action" because the criminal liability of
corporate officers under the FDCA does not turn on an officer's
"awareness of some wrongdoing" or "conscious fraud. ' 38 The Court
observed:
[T]he Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the
facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the
first instance, or promptly to 39correct, the violation complained
of, and that he failed to do so.
The Court stated that a finding of guilt must be based upon both a
showing that the defendant had a responsible relation to the situation
and, that by virtue of his position, he had the authority and responsibility to deal with the situation. 4° Thus, implicit in the Court's opinion
is the conclusion that the liability of a corporate officer may not be
based solely on the defendant's position within the corporation.
Nevertheless, the Court noted that corporate officials would be subject
to criminal liability under the FDCA if their failure to exercise the
supervisory responsibility conferred on them by the business organization resulted in a violation of the statute. 41 The Court explained that
the case law interpreting the FDCA established not only a positive duty
to seek out and remedy violations when they occur, but also a duty to
implement measures to ensure that violations do not occur in the first
place.42 Echoing Dotterweich, the Court reasoned that the burdens
36. Id. at 660. Park was convicted under § 331(k) of the FDCA, which prohibited:
The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole
or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a
food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for
sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and
results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
Id. at 660-61 & n.2 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1938)).
37. Park, 421 U.S. at 663-64.
38. Id. at 672-73.
39. Id. at 673-74.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 671.

42. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
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placed on corporate officers by the FDCA were permissible:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and
perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public
has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions
of authority in business enterprises whose services and products
affect the health and well-being of the public that supports
them.4 3

In short, in Dotterweich and Park, the Supreme Court established
the principle that a corporate official with authority and responsibility
for supervising subordinates may be held criminally liable-without a
showing of affirmative wrongful action or intent-for a subordinate's
violation of a public welfare statute" that contains no mens rea requirement and carries only misdemeanor penalties. This principle has
become known as the RCO doctrine.
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND THE
REQUIRED PROOF OF KNOWLEDGE

The RCO doctrine originated in misdemeanor prosecutions under a
public welfare statute-the FDCA-which has no mens rea requirement.45 In recent years, however, attempts have been made to extend
the RCO doctrine as set forth in Dotterweich and Park to felony prosecutions under federal environmental laws which, unlike the FDCA,
require the government to establish a mens rea of knowledge as an
43. Id. In light of this standard of care, the Court noted that evidence demonstrating
that the official was "powerless" to prevent or correct the violation may be presented defensively at trial. Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376
U.S. 86, 91 (1964)). Park was unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade the jury that as
president of such a large corporation, he had no choice but to delegate duties to responsible subordinates. Park, 421 U.S. at 663-64. The evidence presented by the
government showed that Park had repeatedly been advised by the Food and Drug
Administration of unsanitary warehouse conditions and therefore he was on notice that
his system for delegating responsibility for warehouse sanitation was not working.
Park, 421 U.S. at 661-62, 664.
44. The Supreme Court has described a public welfare offense as the product of a special type of regulatory legislation that dispenses with the mens rea requirement because
the injury is the same regardless of the violator's intent. See Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952). In Morissette, the Court concluded that strict liability under public welfare offenses is justified because "[t]he accused, if he does not will
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who
assumed his responsibilities." Id. at 256. The Dotterweich Court similarly described the
FDCA as a "familiar" type of regulatory legislation that dispenses with the conventional
mens rea requirement for criminal conduct and instead uses misdemeanor penalties to
effect compliance. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 18-44.
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element of the crime. Before considering the propriety of these
attempts to extend the application of the RCO doctrine, a brief
overview of the mens rea requirement' and the methods of establishing this element of environmental criminal liability is in order.
A. The Mens Rea Requirement Generally
Historically, criminal laws have required that to secure a conviction,
the government must show that the defendant had both "an evil meaning mind" and "an evil-doing hand."4 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the proof of criminal intent 4 is central to the American
criminal justice system, noting that "[tihe existence of a mens rea is the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence. 1149
1. Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Mens Rea
In general, there are two types of evidence that may be used to
prove elements of a crime-direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.5° Direct evidence often consists of the testimony of a person,
such as an eyewitness, who claims to have actual knowledge of a
fact.5 This evidence directly establishes an element of the crime with46. Criminal statutes generally require proof of one of four types of mens rea as an
element of a crime:
(1) [Cirimes requiring intention (or purpose) to do the forbidden act
(omission) or cause the forbidden result; (2) crimes requiring knowledge of the
nature of the act (omission) or of the result which will follow therefrom or of
the attendant circumstances; (3) those requiring recklessness in doing the act
(omission) or causing the result (subjective fault in that the actor must in his
own mind realize the risk which his conduct involves); and (4) those requiring
only negligence in so doing or causing (objective fault in creating an unreasonable risk; but, since the actor need not realize the risk in order to be
negligent, no subjective fault is required).
I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 (1986).
Because the federal environmental statutes under which most prosecutions occur require
proof of knowledge to satisfy the mens rea requirement, see infra note 60, this section
will focus specifically on proof of knowledge rather than on mens rea in general.
47. Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Improving Fairness in Environmental Enforcement, 7
Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1029, 1031 n.84 (Feb. 3, 1993) (citing United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)) [hereinafter Gaynor, Improving Fairness]. See
also 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 46, § 3.4.
48. "Mens rea," "scienter," and "criminal intent" are all terms describing the mental
element that generally must be shown to prove that a person has committed a crime. See
I LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 46, § 3.4.
49. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
50. See 1 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §
12.04 (4th ed. 1992).
5 1. See id. See also Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,151 n.70.
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out the use of inferences. By contrast, circumstantial evidence is proof
of a collateral set of facts and circumstances from which an element of
the crime may be inferred.52 There is no distinction made in the weight
given to either direct or circumstantial evidence; nor is a greater level of
certainty
required for circumstantial evidence to suffice as proof of a
53
fact.

Criminal intent is rarely proven by direct evidence because it is
nearly impossible to show a defendant's subjective state of mind directly, unless, of course, the defendant openly confesses to it. 54 Thus,
it is often necessary to infer the defendant's state of mind from the circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal activity, such
as the
55
defendant's conduct, statements, expertise, or other evidence.
2. Using Willful Blindness to Satisfy the Knowledge Requirement
"Willful blindness" is a well-recognized evidentiary doctrine that
allows the trier of fact to infer the element of knowledge from proof
that defendants deliberately closed their eyes to avoid gaining knowledge of an unlawful act.56 A defendant's conscious choice to avoid
learning the truth by deliberately remaining ignorant of facts that would
otherwise be obvious permits the trier of fact to infer that the defendant
knew of the existence of the wrongful action, thus satisfying the element of mens rea. 57 Knowledge of facts that would induce most
52. See 1 DEVITT, supra note 50, § 12.04; Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at
10,151 n.70.
53. 1 DEVTT, supra note 50, § 12.04; Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,151
n.70.
54. See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 46, § 3.5(f) (noting that a criminal defendant
"does not often [at the time of the criminal act] speak or write out his thoughts for others
to hear or read[;]" nor "will [he] generally admit later to having the intention which the
crime requires"). See also 1 DEVITT, supra note 50, § 17.07.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1087 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
"knowledge of prior illegal activity ... most certainly provides circumstantial evidence
of the defendant's later knowledge from which the jury may draw the necessary inference"). See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 46, § 3.5(0; 1 DEVITT, supra note 50, §
17.07. See also Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,151 n.70. The concept that
criminal intent or knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence is so ensconced
in American criminal jurisprudence that it is "explicitly or implicitly recognized in virtually every set of jury instructions now in publication." Hartman & De Monaco, supra
note 1,at 10,151.
56. See 1 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 46, § 3.5(b); Hartman & De Monaco, supra
note 1, at 10,151-52; 1 DEVITT, supra note 50, § 17.09. See generally Ira P. Robbins,
The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990).
57. See, e.g., Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1898) (holding that wrongful intent "may be presumed if the [defendant] purposely keeps himself in ignorance of
[the crime], or is grossly indifferent to his duty in respect to the ascertainment of that

1994]

Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine

people to investigate further, but which did not so induce the defendant, allows an inference that the defendant knew the facts that would
be uncovered upon investigation and thus consciously avoided discovering those facts. 58 Accordingly, under the willful blindness doctrine,
a criminal defendant's actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance are
considered to be equally culpable, and proof of either may satisfy the
requirement of knowledge in a criminal statute.59
B. The Knowledge Requirement in ParticularEnvironmentalStatutes

Most federal environmental statutes require proof of a mens rea of at
least knowledge to satisfy the mental element of a felony violation.6 °
An act is generally said to be performed knowingly if it is done
"voluntarily and intentionally and not because of ignorance, mistake,
accident or some other reason."'6 This requirement in criminal statutes
fact"); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (holding
that in a prosecution under federal drug laws, "the government must prove, 'beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware [of the crime] . .. his
ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of ... a conscious purpose to
avoid learning the truth"'), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). See also Hartman & De
Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,151 & n.71.
58. See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 52 n.15
(1st Cir. 1991) (quoting with approval the district court's jury instruction on willful
blindness); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) ("The conscious avoidance principle means only that specific knowledge may be inferred when a
person knows other facts that would induce most people to acquire the specific knowledge in question."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982). Discussing the concept of
knowledge, Professors LaFave and Scott wrote:
[O]ne has knowledge of a given fact when he has the means for obtaining such
knowledge, when he has notice of facts which would put one on inquiry as to
the existence of that fact, when he has information sufficient to generate a
reasonable belief as to that fact, or when the circumstances are such that a
reasonable man would believe that such a fact existed.
I LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 46, § 3.5(b) (footnotes omitted).
59. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700.
60. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972 § 14, 7
U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1988) (requiring knowledge); Toxic Substance Control Act of
1976 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring knowledge or willfulness);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act" or "CWA") § 312, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(2) (1988) (requiring knowledge); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1986 § 108, 42
U.S.C. § 300i-l(a), (d) (1988) (requiring intent to harm); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988) (requiring knowledge); Clean Air Act of 1963 ("CAA") § 392, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1990)
(requiring knowledge); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988) (requiring knowledge). See also Seymour, supra note 11, at 347 n.47.
61. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 52 n.15. See also I LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra
note 46, § 3.5(b) ("[Olne acts 'knowingly' if 'he is aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause such a result."' (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii))).
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is designed to guard against conviction of a defendant for either an
unintentional act or one for which the defendant did not understand the
consequences.62
Determining the level of knowledge required for conviction under
these complex and continually changing environmental statutes is not a
straightforward task. The ambiguities within these statutes have
caused considerable disagreement among the federal appellate courts as
to what constitutes knowledge sufficient to subject a defendant to
criminal liability.63 The following sections discuss how the courts
have interpreted the mens rea requirements of various federal environmental statutes.
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") prohibits,
inter alia, any person from knowingly treating, storing, or disposing
of any hazardous waste without a permit or knowingly transporting
such waste to a facility that does not have a permit.6 4 One of the
ambiguities raised by the mens rea requirement is whether the
"knowing" state of mind required by RCRA attaches to each element
of the crime. The majority of courts that have considered this question
62. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d. at 52 n.15.
63. See Gaynor, Improving Fairness,supra note 47, at 1031. Most courts have correctly held that it is not necessary for the government to prove that a defendant had the
specific intent to violate a federal environmental statute which requires only knowledge
for the mens rea element. See Geoffrey M. Dugan, Liabilities of Corporate Individuals
for Environmental Claims Under CERCLA: The Current State of the Law and Strategies
for Coping, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074, 10,077 (Feb. 1993). A criminal
defendant has the specific intent to commit a crime when he has a conscious objective to
cause the specific result proscribed by the statute. See Kevin A. Gaynor et al.,
Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes For A Flawed System, 7 Tox. L.
Rep. (BNA) 994, 998 (Jan. 27, 1993) (citing 22 C.J.S.2d § 32, at 38); 1 LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra note 46, § 3.5 (discussing the distinction between "'general [criminal]
intent.' and "'specific intent'). See also supra note 46 (discussing the four types of
mens rea). Most federal appellate courts have only required the government to show that
the defendant had the general criminal intent set forth in the statute. See Dugan, supra,
at 10,077.
64. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988). A violation of § 6928(d) is committed by
any person who:
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a
permit under this subchapter ... [or]
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified
or listed under this subchapter either(A) without a permit under this subchapter.. .; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit ....
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
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have held that the knowledge requirement does not attach to every
element of the crime.65 Courts have reached varying conclusions,
however, as to which elements are subject to the knowledge
requirement. For example, while most courts agree that it is not
necessary for the government to prove the defendant knew the act
committed constituted a crime,66 there has been considerable
disagreement among the courts as to whether the government must
show that the defendant knew of the permit requirement or knew that
the facility lacked a proper permit. 67
65. See, e.g., United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645-46 (11th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1036-39 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1083 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-05 (1lth Cir.
1986). But see United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). See generally Ralph V. Seep, Annotation,
Necessity of Proof of Scienter Under Statute Fixing Criminal Penalties for Hazardous
Waste Violations (42 USCS §6928(d)), 106 A.L.R. FED. 836 (1992).
66. See, e.g., Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613 ("[l~t is not required that [the defendant] know
that there is a regulation which says what he is storing is hazardous under the RCRA."
(footnote omitted)); Dee, 912 F.2d at 745 (applying the "time honored rule" that ignorance of the law is no defense to prosecutions for RCRA violations); Hayes Int'l Corp.,
786 F.2d at 1503 (stating that those who operate in heavily regulated areas are presumed
to know the applicable regulatory provisions). Contra Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at
668 (interpreting the knowledge requirement under § 6928(d) to apply to every element
of the crime).
67. Compare Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d at 1505 ("[T]o convict under [42 U.S.C.]
section 6928(d)(1), the jurors must find that ... the defendant knew the disposal site had
no permit.") and Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669 ("[T]o convict each defendant
[under § 6928(d)(2)(A)] the jury must find that each knew that [the facility] .. .did not
have a permit.") with Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039 ("[K]nowledge of the absence of a permit
is not an element of the offense defined by [§ 6928(d)(2)(A)].").
There also has been some disagreement concerning whether the knowledge requirement
attaches to the hazardous characteristics of the waste (as defined by the regulations).
Most courts, however, have concluded that it is sufficient for RCRA purposes to prove
that the defendant knew of the general deleterious nature of the waste. See Self, 2 F.3d at
1091 ("The defendant need have no specific knowledge of the particular hazardous characteristics of the material in question, only that it was a hazardous waste and not a benign or innocuous material such as water."); Goldsmith, 978 F.2d at 645 ("The
government need only prove that a defendant had knowledge of 'the general hazardous
character' of the chemical."); Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613 ("'[Kjnowingly' [as used in §
6928(d)(2)(A)] means . . . that the defendant knows . . .that what is being stored
factually has the potential for harm to others or the environment ....");Dee, 912 F.2d
at 745 ("[T]he knowledge element of [42 U.S.C.] § 6928(d) does extend to knowledge of
the general hazardous character of the wastes."); Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039 ("The term
'knowingly' modifies 'hazardous waste' as well as 'treats, stores or disposes of,' and thus,
one who does not know the waste he is disposing of is hazardous cannot violate [42
U.S.C.] section 6928(d)(2)(A)."); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 ([T]he word
'knowingly' [in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A)] . . .must also encompass knowledge that the
waste material is hazardous.").
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The Third Circuit, in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,68
appears to have adopted the strictest and most traditional approach to
the application of mens rea under RCRA. 69 There, the court held that a
violation of section 6928(d) requires proof of knowledge as to every
element of the crime: that the defendant knew he or she was disposing
of material that the defendant knew was hazardous; that the defendant
knew a permit was required for disposal; and that a permit had not
been obtained.7 ° This holding is a minority position and has been
rejected by most other circuits.7
In sum, there is considerable disagreement on how to apply the
knowledge requirement contained in RCRA. As shown in parts IV
and V, it appears that this disagreement, arising from the ambiguous
language in the statute, has opened the door for prosecutors and courts
to apply the RCO doctrine.
2. Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act
The language of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") 7 2 and of the Clean
Air Act ("CAA")7 3 further illustrates the ambiguity and confusion sur-

rounding the knowledge element of the criminal enforcement provisions of federal environmental statutes, particularly as they apply to
corporate officers. Like RCRA, both the CWA and the CAA require
the government to prove "knowledge" before a defendant may be held
criminally liable for a felony violation. 74 In contrast to RCRA, however, the courts' confusion in interpreting the mens rea requirement of
the CWA and CAA stems not from the textual ambiguity as to the
application of the term "knowledge," but rather from the legislative
amendments to the CWA and CAA that specifically included RCOs as
criminally liable parties. Both the CWA and the CAA were amended
after their enactment to include "any responsible corporate officer" in
the definition of the term "person. 01
68. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
69. See Dugan, supra note 63, at 10,078.
70. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
71. See, e.g., Dee, 912 F.2d at 745 ("[T]he government did not need to prove
defendants knew violation of RCRA was a crime ... however ...the knowledge element
of §6928(d) does extend to knowledge of the general hazardous character of the
wastes."); Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039 ("[K]nowledge of the absence of a permit is not an
element of the offense defined by 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).").
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1266 (1988).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7508 (1988).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988).
75. The amendments to the CWA and the CAA can be found respectively at Pub. L.
No. 100-4, § 312, 101 Stat. 7, 44 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988))
and Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 111, 91 Stat. 685, 705 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
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The change that Congress intended to effect by these amendments is
unclear. Several decades before these amendments, the Supreme
Court had held, without the assistance of a legislative definition, that a
corporate official was in fact a "person" subject to liability under the
FDCA.7 6 Thus, the legislative amendments to include RCOs in the
definition of "person" in these other acts would appear to have been
unnecessary unless Congress intended a change more significant than
merely including corporate officers as potentially liable parties under
the CWA and CAA.
While it is possible that Congress might have intended to incorporate the RCO doctrine, as established in Dotterweich, into the CWA
and CAA, such a result would create an internal inconsistency with respect to the statutes' mens rea requirements for felony violations.
Both the CWA and CAA require the government to show that a defendant had "knowledge" of the violation to satisfy the mental element of
the felony. The RCO doctrine, however, imposes liability without
regard to the state of mind of the defendant." Thus, incorporating the
RCO doctrine into the CWA and CAA would eliminate the mens rea
clearly required for felonies by the express statutory language. Had
Congress meant to displace the statutory mental element in felony
prosecutions of corporate officers, it could have done so more clearly.
It thus seems highly unlikely that Congress intended by this simple
amendment to completely eliminate
78 one element of a crime solely in
prosecutions of corporate officials.
There is very little legislative history on these amendments from
which to glean Congress' intent.7 9 The only comment concerning the
addition of this category of individuals to the definition of "person" is
found in a report from the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works addressing the 1977 amendment to the CAA, which
states:
For the purpose of liability for criminal penalties the term "person" is defined to include any responsible corporate officer.
7413(c)(3) (1988)).
76. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943); supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
77. See supra notes 15-44 and accompanying text.
78. Furthermore, it is questionable whether, if Congress had meant to codify the RCO
doctrine, it would have left the courts such wide latitude to interpret the definition and
scope of the doctrine, since application of the RCO doctrine to environmental criminal
statutes was not generally accepted at the time Congress passed the amendments.
79. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 988 (discussing the legislative history of the CAA
and CWA); Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,148. See also United States v.
Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991).
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This is based on a similar definition in the enforcement section
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Committee intends that criminal penalties be sought against those corporate
officers under whose responsibility a violation has taken place,
and not just those employees
directly involved in the operation
80
of the violating source.
Thus, while it is clear that Congress intended to hold corporate officers
liable for environmental crimes committed under their watch, it is not
clear that Congress intended a substantive change in the criminal law.
Moreover, at the time of these amendments, both the CWA and
CAA called only for penalties at the misdemeanor level; felony sanctions were not added until later. 8 1 It is doubtful that Congress intended, either at the time of the RCO amendments or at the time of the
felony amendments, to put corporate officers who had no actual
knowledge of a violation at risk of being penalized with the substantial
periods of incarceration that accompany felony convictions. 82 It is
more probable that Congress added the "responsible corporate officer"
language intending not to displace the mens rea requirement of the
statutes, but simply to make clear that corporate officials-not just the
subordinate employee who personally executed the illegal act-were
liable for knowing violations.83 Nevertheless, the specific inclusion of
the term "responsible corporate officer" in statutes imposing felonylevel penalties for "knowing" violations has led to confusion in determining whether to evaluate the statutes' mens rea element under the
knowledge requirement specified in the text of the statute, or rather,
under the less stringent RCO doctrine.
IV. THREE VIEWS ON EXTENDING THE RCO DOCTRINE
To ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES: FROM STRICT
LIABILITY To LEGAL FICTION

The ambiguity and confusion surrounding the mens rea element required by many federal environmental statutes has caused courts and
commentators to draw widely varying conclusions concerning whether
the RCO doctrine may be extended to federal environmental statutes
that have a required mental element and prescribe felony-level penal80. S. REP. No. 94-717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1976), reprintedin 6 A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, No. 95-16, 4701, 4741 (1978)).
See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,148; Zarky, supra note 12, at 988.
81. See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,148-49. Felony sanctions were
added to the CWA in 1987 and to the CAA in 1990. Id.
82. Id. at 10,148 & n.45, 10,149.
83. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 985-87.
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ties. Moreover, of those authorities that have advocated the extension
of the RCO doctrine to these statutes, opinions are divided regarding
the extent to which the RCO doctrine affects the statute's mens rea requirement. To date, no court has held that the RCO doctrine should be
applied as a strict liability rule, that entirely displaces the express
statutory mens rea requirement contained in these statutes. A few
decisions, however, have suggested that such an application may be
permissible. 84 By contrast, some courts have held that the RCO doctrine does not replace the mens rea requirement.85 In some of these
latter cases, however, courts have indicated that a modified version of
the RCO doctrine may be applied in the context of environmental
laws.86 These decisions have given rise to three distinct theories of the
extent to which the RCO doctrine affects the mens rea requirement of
federal environmental statutes: the strict liability approach; the reduced
knowledge approach; and the status quo approach. Each of these
theories and the cases that support them are discussed and analyzed
below.
A. The RCO Doctrine Creates Strict Liability
Under the strict liability approach, the RCO doctrine as set forth in
cases decided under the FDCA87 may be applied to environmental
statutes requiring a mens rea. Such an application of the RCO doctrine
therefore displaces the element of knowledge required by many environmental statutes and imposes a strict liability scheme, transforming a
mens rea-requiring crime into a strict liability offense for corporate
officers.88 Under this view, an officer may be convicted of a felony
based simply upon the officer's position of authority rather than upon
the officer's acts and actual mental state. 89 Accordingly, the application of the RCO doctrine removes the mental element of the crime
84. See, e.g., United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991), discussed infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text; United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.,
602 F.2d 1123, 1130 n.ll (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980), discussed
infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 55
(1st Cir. 1991), discussed infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text; United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208
(1985), discussed infra notes 112-25 and accompanying text; United States v. White,
766 F. Supp. 873, 894-95 (E.D. Wash. 1991), discussed infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55; Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at
669-70.
8 7. See supra part II.
88. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 987. See also Broudy, supra note 6, at 1058.
89. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 987. See also supra text accompanying note 44.
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based solely upon the defendant's "job description. '"9° The corporate
officer becomes the "designated felon," criminally liable when subordinates commit illegal acts.
The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.91
has frequently been invoked to support the theory that the RCO doctrine imposes strict liability when applied to certain environmental
statutes. 92 In Frezzo, a family-operated mushroom farming business
and its corporate officers were convicted of willfully or negligently
discharging pollutants into navigable waters without a permit in violation of the CWA. 93 On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the issue
of RCO liability in a footnote, stating that "[t]he Government argued
the case on the 'responsible corporate officer doctrine' recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Park and United
States v. Dotterweich. We have examined the judge's charge and perceive no error in the instruction to the jury on this theory." 94
The Third Circuit's language in Frezzo may appear on its face tacitly
to support the application of the RCO doctrine to the CWA, thus lending credence to the view that corporate officers can be held strictly
liable under that statute. In fact, however, it does not. The defendants
were held liable as individuals on the basis of considerable evidence
presented at trial that they actually knew of the ongoing pollution violations and did not remedy them, which was sufficient to prove individual liability. 95 On appeal of their convictions, the defendants in
Frezzo did not challenge how the liability of corporate officers had
been defined at trial. Rather, they argued that it was improper for the
90. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 987.
91. 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
92. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 990 (commenting that the government "frequently"
raises Frezzo to support the proposition that the RCO doctrine creates strict liability in
environmental statutes). See also Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal
Environmental Enforcement Program: Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You
Should Guard Against Prosecution Through an Environmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 227, 239 n.55 (citing Frezzo for the proposition that the RCO doctrine imputes knowledge of violations to responsible managers).
93. Frezzo, 602 F.2d at 1125. The charges were pursuant to CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§
131 1(a) and 1319(c). See id. at 1124. The corporation was fined $50,000 and the
individual defendants, the president and the secretary of the corporation, each were
sentenced to 30 days in jail and were fined $50,000 in the aggregate. Id.
94. Id. at 1130 n. Il (citations omitted).
95. Frezzo, 602 F.2d at 1125-29, 1129 n.9. At trial there was testimony that state
and county employees had -investigated and confronted the defendants concerning the
pollution numerous times, and that the defendants had admitted in a letter to the state environmental agency that the holding tank they used to contain waste was effective only
95% of the time. See United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 270 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
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trial court to have instructed the jury that they could be found guilty as
individuals when the government had argued the case on the RCO
doctrine and the indictment had charged them with acting as corporate
officials. 96 Thus, neither the issue of strict liability under the RCO
doctrine nor the necessary mens rea of a corporate officer was before
the Third Circuit in Frezzo.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Brittain97 has also
been used to support the proposition that the RCO doctrine creates
strict liability when applied to environmental statutes.98 In Brittain, the
Public Utilities Director for the City of Enid, Oklahoma, was convicted
of two misdemeanor counts under the CWA for willfully or negligently discharging pollutants into navigable waters without a permit. 99
Appealing his conviction, the Director argued that because he was not
a permittee or an RCO of a permittee, he was not a "person" subject to
liability under the CWA.' 00 He reasoned that Congress would not
have amended the statutory definition of a liable "person" to specifically include RCOs if that term had a common sense meaning that included all individuals, rather than just permittees.' ° ' The Tenth Circuit
rejected this argument, concluding instead that the addition of
"responsible corporate officer" to the CWA definition was an expansion rather than an implicit limitation of liability.'°2
Although the Director was held liable as an individual and the question of RCO liability was not at issue in the case, the Tenth Circuit
nevertheless suggested that it would be appropriate to apply the RCO
doctrine to the CWA. 10 3 The court stated that "to be held criminally
96. Frezzo, 602 F.2d at 1130 n.ll.
97. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
98. See Steven M. Morgan & Allison K. Obermann, Perils of the Profession:
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine May FacilitateA Dramatic Increase in Criminal
Prosecutions of Environmental Offenders, 45 Sw. L.J. 1199, 1206-07 (1991).
99. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1415, 1417-18. As in Frezzo, the defendant was convicted
pursuant to CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c). See id. at 1418.
100. Id. at 1419.
101. Id.
102. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419. The court explained that "[t]he plain language of
the statute, after all, states that 'responsible corporate officers' are liable 'inaddition to'
the definition [of persons]." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 1419-20, 1420 n.5. The government did not prosecute the case under an
RCO theory, and the jury was never presented with the question of RCO liability. Id.
Contrary to the Director's contention, the jury considered more evidence than simply his
position of responsibility. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1420. Evidence was presented at trial
that the Director had primary operational responsibility for the facility, that he personally observed the unlawful discharges, that he was told by subordinates that such discharges were prone to occur during heavy rains, that he reviewed logs recording repeated
illegal discharges, and that he instructed the plant supervisor not to report the
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liable, [an RCO] would not have to 'willfully or negligently' cause a
permit violation. Instead, the willfullness or negligence of the actor
would be imputed to [the RCO] . . .by virtue of his position of
responsibility." 104 The court asserted that the public welfare objectives
of the FDCA also applied to the CWA and that Congress, in specifically including RCOs as liable parties under the CWA, perceived the
goal of eliminating pollution from the nation's waters to outweigh the
hardships suffered by RCOs who are
held criminally liable despite
1 5
their lack of conscious wrongdoing.
This opinion appears to represent the broadest application of the
RCO doctrine to an environmental statute. Under the Tenth Circuit's
approach, the RCO doctrine simply imputes the requisite mens rea
from a subordinate to a corporate official based solely upon the official's position in the company. 0 6 It is important to note, however,
that RCO liability was never at issue in Brittain, and thus it is still not
settled that the Tenth Circuit would apply the RCO doctrine to the
CWA if it were directly confronted with that question. Moreover, the
crime in Brittain involved only misdemeanor penalties and required a
mens rea of willfullness or negligence. Because many environmental
crimes today are felonies and require a mens rea of knowledge, the
court's language in Brittain, apparently approving the application of
the RCO doctrine to the CWA, does not support the elimination of the
mens rea requirement in prosecutions under environmental provisions
that carry felony-level penalties.
B. The RCO Doctrine Reduces the Mens Rea Requirement
Several commentators have suggested that rather than completely
eliminating the mens rea requirement contained in environmental
statutes, the application of the RCO doctrine simply reduces the
requisite mental state needed for a defendant to be held criminally liable
under those statutes.'0 7 These commentators assert that the application
violations to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as required by the permit
that the EPA had issued for the facility. Id.
104. Id. at 1419.
105.

Id.

106. Indeed, one commentator has noted that Brittain "should set off alarms in
corporate board rooms" because it makes criminal liability vicarious for corporate officers. See Morgan & Obermann, supra note 98, at 1207.
107.

See, e.g., Seymour, supra note 11, at 342-43 (concluding that the court's inter-

pretation of the RCO doctrine as applied to RCRA in United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp.,
786 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986), "minimized the burden of proof on the government").
See also Richard G. Singer, The "Responsible Corporate Officer" Doctrine in
Environmental Cases, 6 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1405, 1407 (Apr. 15, 1992) [hereinafter
Singer, Environmental Cases] (discussing the reduced knowledge theory and concluding
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of the RCO doctrine to such statutes permits the jury to infer a corporate officer's knowledge of a statutory violation from the fact that the
officer held a particular position in the corporation. 1°8 Thus, in addition to proving knowledge through circumstantial evidence and willful
blindness, 1°9 the government may prove knowledge simply by showing that a corporate officer should have known of the violation by
virtue of the officer's position." ° Accordingly, these commentators
view the effect of the RCO doctrine as reducing the level of mens rea
required to convict a corporate officer and easing the prosecution's
burden."'
The reduced knowledge approach relies upon the Third Circuit's
opinion in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. 1 2 In Johnson &
Towers, the Third Circuit ruled that any individual or "person" who
knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous waste without a
permit is subject to criminal liability under RCRA regardless of
whether that individual is in the position to secure a permit." 3 The defendants, two employees who were charged along with their company
for RCRA violations, argued that only the owners or operators of a
facility are "persons" subject to RCRA liability because only these individuals are in a position to obtain the requisite permit." 4
To support their argument that the term "person" in RCRA was not
given the meaning suggested by the plain language of the statute, the
defendants claimed that in two similar statutes, the CAA and the CWA,
Congress amended the definition of person to add RCOs and that had
Congress originally intended for this term to be given a common sense
meaning, such an amendment would not have been necessary because
RCOs are obviously people or persons in the common sense understanding of that word." 5 The Third Circuit expressly declined to rule
on the meaning of the term "person" in the CAA and the CWA, as
that the commentators who have interpreted certain cases as establishing this theory
have misconstrued those opinions, and that what has been identified as a reduced knowledge standard is actually "an application of the long-standing doctrine that mistake (or
ignorance) of the law is not relevant in most criminal proceedings").
108. See, e.g., Seymour, supra note 11, at 343.
109. For a more thorough discussion of the use of circumstantial evidence and the
doctrine of willful blindness in criminal cases generally, see supra parts MlI.A. and III.B.
1 10. See Seymour, supra note 11, at 343.
111. See id. See also Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1407

(rejecting the theory that the RCO doctrine reduced the knowledge required when applied
to environmental statutes).
112. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
113. Id. at 666-67.
114.

Id. at 664.

115. Id. at 665 n.3.
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those acts were not before the court, but it noted that the addition of
RCOs to the CAA and the CWA seemed to expand rather than implicitly limit liability." 6 Broadening the scope of this provision through
the addition of RCOs, the court observed, could not have been meant
to "'reliev[e] from ... liability the individual agents of the corporation. ' ' 17 Relying on Dotterweich, the Third Circuit concluded that "in
RCRA, no less than in the Food and Drug Act, Congress endeavored
to control hazards that, 'in the circumstances of modem industrialism,
are largely beyond self-protection."'1 8 Consequently, the Third
Circuit rejected the defendants' assertion, holding that liability under
RCRA attaches to any individual who knowingly handles hazardous
waste without a permit." 9
The Third Circuit also addressed the issue of the applicability of
RCRA's knowledge requirement to the other elements of section
6928(d)(2). In doing so, the court ruled that to secure a conviction
under this provision, the government must prove that the defendant
had knowledge with respect to every element of the offense. 20 The
court added, however, that criminal knowledge "may be inferred by
the jury as to those individuals who hold
the requisite responsible
2
positions with the corporate defendant."' '
Some commentators note that this language appears to be similar to
the RCO doctrine as set forth by the Supreme Court in Dotterweich
and Park and, as a result, they maintain that the decision in Johnson &
Towers stands for the proposition that the RCO doctrine, as applied to
federal environmental laws, reduces the government's burden of
proving knowledge. 22 The Third Circuit's language in Johnson &
Towers, however, is actually consistent with the traditional use of circumstantial evidence to prove mens rea,2 3 since the court did not state24
that liability must be inferred, but only that it may be inferred.
Thus, neither the holding nor the reasoning in Johnson & Towers
supports the use of a reduced knowledge25approach in felony prosecutions under federal environmental laws.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665 n.3.
Id. (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 282).
Id. at 667 (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280).
Id.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.
Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
See Seymour, supra note 11, at 342-43.
See supra part III.A.1.
See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.
See Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1407.
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C. The RCO Doctrine Does Not Expand Liability
The third view as to the scope and applicability of the RCO doctrine
is the status quo approach. According to this approach, the special instruction given on the liability of corporate officers does not alter the
mental element normally required by the statute, but instead makes
clear that an officer's knowing failure to act to prevent illegal activity
renders the officer as culpable as the individual who actually performed the illegal act.
The First Circuit adopted the status quo approach in United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.1 26 In that case, the First Circuit
overturned the felony conviction of a company president, ruling that
the trial court's jury instructions improperly suggested that the president could be convicted of a knowing RCRA violation based upon his
position as a responsible corporate officer and without actual proof of
knowledge. 127 The jury had been instructed that knowledge could be
proven either by a showing of actual knowledge or by a showing that
the defendant was an RCO. 28 The trial court stated that a defendant is
an RCO if the defendant (1) was a corporate officer, (2) had the responsibility to supervise the allegedly illegal activities, and
(3) knew or
29
occurred.
alleged
type
the
of
activity
illegal
that
believed
The First Circuit ruled that this test was inconsistent with the express mens rea requirement in RCRA because it did not simply allow
the jury to infer knowledge, but rather permitted the jury conclusively
to presume knowledge "so long as the officer knew or even erroneously believed that illegal activity of the same type had occurred on
another occasion." 30 The First Circuit agreed that knowledge may be
inferred from willful blindness or circumstantial evidence, including a
defendant's position, responsibility, and conduct, and information
provided to the defendant on prior occasions.' 3 ' The court, however,
held that it was improper to allow a conclusive presumption of knowledge based on such evidence when the crime expressly requires the
proof of knowledge as an element. 3 2 The simple fact that the officer
knew of a previous violation, the court reasoned, does not establish
that he possessed knowledge of the violation charged.'3 3 Accordingly,
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
Id. at 50-51.
Id.
Id. at 50, 52.
MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 53.
Id. at 52, 54.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 55.
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the court concluded that "[iln a crime having knowledge as an express
element, a mere showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich
and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof
of knowledge."' 34
The First Circuit thus demanded proof of mens rea where expressly
required by statute. It rejected the application of the RCO doctrine as
set forth in Dotterweich and Park to criminal statutes that expressly
contain a knowledge requirement and impose felony-level penalties.
The court noted, however, that if the trial court had explained to the
jury that the RCO doctrine allowed a permissive inference of knowla concluedge, rather than asserting as it did that the doctrine allowed
35
sive presumption, the conviction might have been upheld.
The use of the status quo approach is further supported by United
States v. White, 136 in which the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington clearly rejected the proposition that a
corporate officer may be held criminally liable for RCRA violations
without proof of actual knowledge. In White, the prosecutor, relying
upon Park and Dotterweich, argued that the company's environmental
safety officer could be held liable for knowing criminal violations of
RCRA simply by virtue of his position of responsibility and authority.'37 The court disagreed, holding that those cases were inapplicable
because they involved strict liability crimes, whereas the criminal provision of RCRA contains a mens rea element of knowledge. 38 The
RCO doctrine, the court ruled, does not apply to crimes where the
applicable statute requires proof of knowledge as an element of the
crime. 39 The court concluded that to secure a conviction, the government must prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the
violations, rather than merely showing that the defendant should have
known of the violations. 4°

134. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
135. Id. at 55 n.20. Based on this statement it has been argued that the First Circuit
has reduced or shifted the prosecutor's burden and modified the RCO doctrine in the context of environmental laws. See Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 6, at 10,103. As explained supra, however, the use of circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact
may infer the element of a crime is consistent with traditional notions of criminal law.
See supra part III.A. 1.
136. 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
137. Id. at 894. As the court characterized the government's theory, "the government
seeks to find [the defendant] guilty not as a principal, aider and abettor, nor [as a] coconspirator, but purely under the theory of respondeat superior." Id.
138. Id. at 894-95.
139. White, 766 F.Supp. at 895.
140. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE THEORIES ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE RCO DOCTRINE

Courts and commentators have presented a number of views as to
the applicability of the RCO doctrine to criminal environmental
statutes. The most sweeping of these views-that the RCO doctrine
holds corporate officers strictly liable for the criminal violations of
their subordinates-should be rejected. The RCO doctrine originated
14
from strict liability offenses prescribing misdemeanor penalties. '
Since a strict liability statute makes all who have a responsible share in
the violations equally culpable regardless of intent,'4 2 it is considered
acceptable in misdemeanor situations to hold a corporate officer criminally liable where the officer stands in a position of "responsible
relation" to the wrongdoing. 4 3 This reasoning, however, does not
apply where a statute expressly prescribes a mens rea of knowledge
and imposes felony-level penalties. 1" When felonies are at issue, all
those guilty of the illegal act may not be equally culpable. 145 Instead,
culpability, and consequently punishment, should be based primarily
on the alleged violator's state of mind.'" Therefore, despite the public
welfare goal of environmental legislation, the rationale in Dotterweich
and Park for applying the RCO doctrine simply does not support the
application of this doctrine to the criminal provisions of environmental
statutes having a specified mens rea requirement and prescribing
felony-level penalties.
Furthermore, when a criminal statute specifically requires proof of
47
knowledge of the criminal act, as do many environmental statutes,
the RCO doctrine cannot be applied as set forth in Dotterweich and
Park because it would wholly eliminate the knowledge element of the
crime for this one class of individuals. Moreover, although the
Supreme Court has held strict liability to be constitutional in certain
situations involving public welfare offenses that result in misdemeanor
violations, 48 imposing significant criminal penalties, such as those
associated with a felony conviction, without first requiring a showing
141. See supra part II.
142. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
143. See supra part II.
144. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 987, 994.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). See also Gaynor, Improving Fairness,supra note
47, at 1032 (citations omitted).
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of mens rea could raise constitutional due process concerns. 49
The reduced knowledge theory of RCO liability is also fundamentally flawed. Some commentators have argued that use of the RCO
doctrine in felony prosecutions under federal environmental laws expressly prescribing a mens rea of knowledge reduces the government's
burden of proof with respect to the showing of scienter and allows a
conviction based upon a showing of a mental state of something less
than actual knowledge. 5 ° This proposition is incorrect and appears to
be based on a misreading of the relevant cases and a degree of
confusion regarding the knowledge required for a felony conviction
under a federal environmental statute. As noted above, the majority of
courts have held that the knowledge requirement under RCRA does
not attach to every element of the crime.'15 Courts are divided,
however, as to which elements the knowledge requirement does
attach.'52 It is possible that some commentators may have interpreted a
court's ruling that knowledge did not attach to certain elements of the
53
crime to be the result of the court's application of the RCO doctrine.
Such a view confuses two separate and distinct issues. In those cases
where a court has held that a certain element of the crime did not
require a showing of knowledge, the court was interpreting the
statutory provision generally and was not limiting its holding to
RCOs. 5 4 Thus, in those situations, the court was not applying the
RCO doctrine.
Additionally, some commentators have argued that when the trier of
fact is permitted to infer knowledge through the use of circumstantial
evidence of an officer's responsibility or authority, this lowers the
level of mens rea required by statute."' This view is also erroneous
149. See Gaynor, Improving Fairness,supra note 47, at 1031-32 (noting that "[tlo
convict a defendant of a serious felony without a high degree of mens rea may be a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process" (footnote omitted)).
150. See Zarky, supra note 12, at 989, 993; Seymour, supra note 11, at 342-43.
151. See supra part I11I.B.1.
152. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
153. See Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1407 (discussing this
confusion).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
155. See Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 6, at 10,103 (stating that the use of circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge is "troubling"); Lisa Harig, Ignorance is Not
Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines,42 DUKE L.J. 145, 151 (1992) (stating that the application of the RCO doctrine is being used "at the very least" to allow the jury to infer
knowledge from circumstantial evidence); Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107,
at 1407 (discussing the misunderstanding of commentators concerning the use of
circumstantial evidence and stating that it is almost impossible to prove knowledge by
direct evidence).
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because, as noted above, the use of circumstantial evidence has traditionally been an alternative
means of proving facts where direct evi156
unavailable.
is
dence
The third theory of RCO liability, the status quo approach, appears
to have gathered the most support from courts and commentators.
Under this approach, the statutorily required level of mens rea is not
changed even though a special instruction may be given to the jury
making it clear that a knowing failure to act to prevent illegal activity
renders the officer as culpable as the individual who personally performed the illegal act.' 57 According to Charles De Monaco, Assistant
Chief of the Environmental Crimes Section of the DOJ, the federal
government now follows this approach in the prosecution of environmental crimes. 5 8 De Monaco asserts that the DOJ will not institute
criminal proceedings against a corporate official for the illegal acts of a
subordinate unless it has facts to show that the official had actual
knowledge of the environmental violation. 159 He adds, however, that
a defendant's position, authority, and responsibility in the company
may be circumstantial evidence of knowledge. 160 The use of these
factors as circumstantial evidence permits the jury to infer that the defendant had the requisite mens rea, but it does not change
the level of
61
mens rea required by statute to secure a conviction.'
This approach to RCO liability is also supported by Professor
Richard Singer, who asserts that the RCO doctrine is simply a "myth"
62
based upon unnecessary dictum in the cases that have discussed it.'
Professor Singer correctly notes that in every case in which a conviction has been upheld, the facts have clearly shown, and the court has
required proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal
activity. 63 He opines that commentators who declare an expansion of
156.

See supra part III.A. I.

157.

See supra part IV.C.

158.

See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,152.

159.

Better Communication, supra note 4, at 1424.

160. See id. For further information on the DOJ's policy concerning criminal prosecutions for violation of federal environmental statutes see U.S. DOJ FACTORS IN
DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATION IN THE CONTEXT OF

Envtl. L.
Rep. Admin. Material (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,399 (July 1, 1991).
161. See Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 1, at 10,152.
162. See Singer, Myth, supra note 24, at 1378.
163. See Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1405. See also Dugan,
supra note 63, at 10,078 (citing United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) and United States v. White, 766 F.
Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991), as cases in which attempts to expand criminal liability
under environmental laws through application of the RCO doctrine have been rejected).
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR,
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the RCO doctrine, as set forth in Dotterweich and Park, to environmental felony prosecutions have inaccurately based their conclusions
64
upon court dicta and erroneous interpretations of the case law.'
The problem remains, however, that while a majority of courts and
commentators generally agree that the RCO doctrine, as set forth in
Dotterweich and Park, is inapplicable to felony prosecutions involving
environmental crimes containing a mens rea element, many continue to
use the language of the RCO doctrine when referring simply to the individual, rather than imputed or vicarious liability of corporate
officers. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see the use of an officer's authority and responsibility as evidence of mens rea being labeled the
"RCO doctrine," even though such use is nothing more than traditional
circumstantial evidence. The RCO doctrine, as set forth in
Dotterweich and Park, is a strict liability rule that should not be applied
to felony prosecutions under laws expressly requiring a showing of
mens rea. Nor should it be confused, however, with the use of an
officer's position in a company as circumstantial evidence that allows a
permissive inference of the requisite mens rea.
VI. TRENDS AND FORECASTS
The confusion surrounding the use and application of the RCO doctrine, together with the recent sharp increase in prosecutions for environmental crimes, has been especially threatening to corporate officers
punishment for those convicted is no longer just a
because the potential' 165
"slap on the wrist.'
In the past, courts generally penalized those
convicted of environmental crimes with suspended sentences, probation, or some type of community service. 166 Today, however,
significant fines and prison terms are no longer uncommon.'67 This
change has been attributed in part to the new agenda of prosecutors to
seek harsher penalties as a deterrent to future violations, and also in
part to federal judges, who are now more than ever constrained to
strict application of penalties due to implementation of the mandatory
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 68 These Guidelines significantly curtail the discretion of trial judges, requiring them to impose sentences
that fall within a69narrow range of possibilities established for each
particular crime. 1
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Singer, Myth, supra note 24, at 1378.
See Zarky, supra note 12, at 984; Morgan & Obermann, supra note 98, at 1209.
Morgan & Obermann, supra note 98, at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1210-11.
See id. at 1211.
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While prosecutors might have attempted in the past to use the RCO
doctrine as an aid in felony prosecutions believing that it would eliminate their burden of proving knowledge, courts have generally rejected
these attempts to apply a strict liability scheme where the text of the
statute expressly requires knowledge.'70 There is little doubt regarding
why prosecutors have tried to apply the RCO doctrine in felony prosecutions of corporate officials for violations of federal environmental
statutes-the culpability of upper-level management is often more
difficult to establish than that of the employees who physically undertake the illegal acts. There are established alternative means by which
to prove knowledge, however, such as the use of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is unavailable.' 71 Indeed, it appears that in
all of the environmental cases raising the RCO doctrine, there has been
considerable direct and circumstantial evidence of knowledge on the
part of the corporate officers. 7 2 Thus, while several commentators
have cried foul at prosecutors' attempts to bypass the statutory mens
rea requirement through use of the RCO doctrine, 73 the fear that laws
enacted by Congress are being altered appears to be unfounded
because the prosecutors in the cases discussed above could have
74
established culpability without the use of the RCO doctrine.
Furthermore, the courts have insisted that they do so and have
thwarted attempts to take constitutionally suspect short-cuts.
Accordingly, it is highly unlikely in a prosecution for a violation of a
federal environmental statute that prescribes felony-level penalties, that
a corporate official today would be imputed with the knowledge of a
subordinate, or that the official would be convicted for violating the
statute without proof, whether circumstantial or direct, that the officer
had the requisite level of mens rea.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is an understandable concern on the part of corporate officers,
and especially corporate environmental managers, that they may
become the "designated felon" and magnet for federal prosecutors
when employees of their corporations violate federal environmental
laws. Based on the limited case law available on this issue, however,
it appears that a conviction obtained without the necessary proof of
170. See Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1407.
17 1. See supra part III.A.
172. See Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1405, 1407.
173. See, e.g., Zarky, supra note 12, at 983, 987-88; Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note
6, at 10,100, 10,102; Broudy, supra note 6, at 1071.
174. See Singer, Environmental Cases, supra note 107, at 1405, 1407.
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mens rea required by the applicable environmental statute will not be
upheld.
It does not appear that the RCO theory of strict criminal liability as
set forth in Dotterweich and Parkhas been extended to environmental
laws that prescribe a knowledge requirement and felony-level penalties. Nor should it be. In the context of prosecutions for violations of
environmental laws, an employee's position in a company should be
used only as circumstantial evidence of knowledge in criminal prosecutions. To prevent confusion and misunderstanding, prosecutors and
courts should avoid labeling such an approach as the "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine.

